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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Valentino Herrera appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Herrera was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction on appeal. State v. Herrera, 152 
Idaho 24, 266 P.3d 499 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Herrera thereafter filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 6-21.) Relevant to this appeal, Herrera asserted a 
claim of denial of counsel because he "never has [sic] counsel until his 
preliminary hearing" (R., pp. 8-9) and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
because counsel did not move to suppress his statements (R., p. 9), did not 
move to continue the trial (R., p. 10), did not move for a change of venue (R., p. 
12), inadequately prepared for trial (R., p. 12), and did not adequately cross-
examine state witnesses (R., p. 16). The state filed an answer to Herrera's 
petition. (R., pp. 2426-28.) 
The state also filed a motion for summary dismissal of the petition. (R., 
pp. 4, 2548-78.) Herrera responded. (R., pp. 2582-05, 2607-15.) The district 
court granted the motion. (R., pp. 2627-61.) It concluded the claim that Herrera 
was denied counsel was "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record in the 
underlying case." (R., p. 2630.) It also dismissed the claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel relevant to this appeal as "bare and conclusory." (R., pp. 
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2632-38.) Herrera filed a notice of appeal timely from entry of judgment. (R., pp. 
2663, 2665.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Herrera states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Whether the district court erred when it summarily denied 
post conviction [sic] relief on the claim that Defendant [sic] 
was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his 
attorney was totally absent during a critical stage of the 
proceedings[.] 
II. Whether the district court erred when. it summarily dismissed 
specific claims in the petition for post-conviction relief[.] 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Herrera failed to show that the district court erred by denying his 
claim that he was denied counsel at a critical stage of the criminal case 
because that claim is disproved by the record and is legally without merit? 
2. Has Herrera failed to show error in the district court's dismissal of claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel during the course of trial proceedings 
because those claims were unsupported by law or evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Herrera Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying His Claim 
That He Was Denied Counsel At A Critical Stage Of The Criminal Case 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Herrera's claim that he "never had counsel" 
until his preliminary hearing as "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record in 
the underlying case." (R., p. 2630.) The record showed Herrera "had a court-
appointed attorney at the inception of the underlying case and at all other 
relevant times." (Id.) 
On appeal Herrera asserts the district court "misunderstands this claim" 
because he was "actually asserting" that "counsel was not actually present with 
Mr. Herrera" at the August 3, 2006 arraignment. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Herrera 
makes this claim without citation to the record and provides no analysis based on 
the words used in his petition. Herrera then argues that an arraignment is 
automatically a "critical stage" at which counsel's absence is automatically 
reversible error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12.) This argument is based on a legal 
claim that is at best sophistry, and at worst highly misleading. Application of the 
law to the record in this case shows that Herrera's appellate claim is meritless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When this Court reviews a district court's summary dismissal 
of a post-conviction petition without a hearing, this Court must 
determine whether the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and 
affidavits on file create a genuine issue of fact. Where the 
evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather than a 
jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences because the court 
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alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict between those 
inferences. Moreover, the trial judge is not constrained to draw 
inferences in favor of the party opposing a summary judgment 
motion. Instead, the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable 
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. 
Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, _, 348 P.3d 145, 151 (2015) (internal cites 
and quotations omitted). 
C. Herrera's Attempt To Amend His Petition On Appeal Should Be Rejected 
On appeal Herrera asserts the district court "misunderstands" his claim 
that he did not have counsel because he was "actually asserting" that "counsel 
was not actually present with Mr. Herrera" at the August 3, 2006 arraignment. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 8. 1) Herrera makes this claim without citation to the record 
and provides no analysis based on the words used in his petition. Review of the 
language of the petition shows that Herrera's claim is meritless. 
The district court characterized this claim as alleging Herrera "did not have 
an attorney in the underlying case until June 30, 2006, the date his preliminary 
hearing was first scheduled to take place." (R., p. 2630.) This is consistent with 
the actual language in the claim, which reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
A.) ARRAIGNMENT Proceeding; CLAIM: 
An arraignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding which 
the accused under federal constitution law is entitled to counsel and 
if the accused is without at the arraignment he may obtain relief 
from his conviction without showing that he suffered a disadvantage 
from such a denial. 
1 The district court's understanding of the claim matches arguments regarding the 
claim Herrera asserted below. (R., pp. 2595-96.) Herrera apparently failed to 
understand his own claims until this appeal. 
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Petitioner's never has counsel until his preliminary hearing on 
June 30, 2006. And at that time he was, he receives a conflict 
attorney, who advised petitioner to wave, a timely preliminary 
hearing. So new counsel could investigate and prepare for 
petitioner's, rescheduled preliminary hearing, which was reset for 
July 14, 2006. 
Petitioner's asks this Honorable Court to remember that counsel 
has only spoken with him about this criminal case, maybe (15) 
fifteenth minutes and that is with only new counsel, his only 
counsel. It had been (40) days since the alleged fight at the Mini-
Cassia County Jail. Please see exhibit: (a) (a-2) (a-3) (a-4) (a-5) 
and (a-6) and there is genuine issue of material fact and if this 
claim is proven true it shall demand relief. 
(R., pp. 8-9 (verbatim).) 
Herrera has not pointed out (nor can he) what language in this count 
indicates that he is claiming that he was deprived of the right to counsel by 
counsel's apparent absence from the August 3, 2006 arraignment. On appeal he 
relies entirely upon Exhibit A-7 to make his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9 
(quoting R., pp. 34-35).) There is, however, no reference to Exhibit A-7 in the 
claim and no factual assertion that counsel was ineffective in relation to the 
August 3, 2006 arraignment. See I.C. § 19-4903 (petition shall "specifically set 
forth the grounds upon which the application is based"). Herrera's claim that the 
district court "misunderstands" his claim is baseless, because the district court, 
as opposed to Herrera on appeal, actually relied upon the language of the claim. 
D. Herrera Failed To Show That The August 3, 2006 Arraignment Was A 
"Critical Stage" Of The Criminal Proceedings 
Even if Herrera's claim was that he was denied counsel because counsel 
was absent at the August 3, 2006 arraignment his claim was properly dismissed 
as "bare, conclusory, and disproven by the record." (R., p. 2630.) 
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Normally a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show 
both deficient performance and prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687-88 (1984); Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 713, 274 P.3d 11, 14 (Ct. 
App. 2012). There are limited circumstances, however, where "prejudice from 
ineffective assistance may be presumed." Zepeda, 152 Idaho at 713, 274 P .3d 
at 14 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-62 (1984)). Such 
circumstances include "where there is a 'complete denial' of counsel at a critical 
stage of trial." & (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658) (emphasis added). "[T]he 
presumption of prejudice generally is employed only to address "circumstances 
that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect is 
unjustified." & (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658). 
Herrera has provided no justification for employing the presumption of 
prejudice in this case. The minutes of the August 3, 2006 arraignment, while 
they do indicate that defense counsel was not present, also indicate that the 
court informed Herrera of the plea options available; explained his rights; 
explained what rights would be given up by entering a guilty plea; provided 
Herrera a copy of the information; confirmed that Herrera's name on the 
information was accurate; advised Herrera of the penalties; and set the matter 
over for entry of plea. (R., pp. 34-35.) The only right Herrera actually waived 
was his right to a reading of the information. (R., p. 34.) There is no reason to 
believe that waiver of the right to a reading of the information was prejudicial to 
Herrera's trial. 
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Rather than create a situation where prejudice must be presumed, the 
record establishes a situation where prejudice cannot be imagined. 
Herrera argues that the Supreme Court of the United States has applied 
the Cronic rule to the absence of counsel at an arraignment. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 10-11.) For this argument he cites to language in Missouri v. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 
1399, 1405 (2012),2 which in turn cites to Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 
(1961 ). In Hamilton the Court found the arraignment in that capital case was a 
"critical stage" because, under Alabama law, certain defenses and challenges to 
grand jury proceedings had to be raised at the arraignment or they were forfeited. 
Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 53-54. Thus, what happened at the arraignment in that 
case "may affect the whole trial" because defenses could be "irretrievably lost." 
~ at 54. An uncounseled arraignment thus presented "the same pitfalls" as an 
uncounseled trial. ~ Thus, "'critical stages' include the pretrial type of 
arraignment where certain rights may be sacrificed or lost." Coleman v. 
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970) (emphasis added).3 
Unlike the situation in Hamilton, Herrera waived no defenses or potential 
challenges to the prior proceedings at the arraignment. The arraignment without 
2 Counsel's claim that the Court in ~ "confirmed what Cronic noted" and is 
"controlling caselaw" (Appellant's brief, p. 11) is highly misleading. The Frye 
court applied the Strickland test to attorney conduct in plea negotiations and did 
not even mention Cronic. 
3 The Supreme Court has distinguished between arraignments that "signal[] the 
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings" and those that constitute "a critical 
stage requiring the presence of counsel." Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 
554 U.S. 191 (2008). It makes no sense, for example, to say that not having 
counsel at an arraignment where a defendant was notified and first asserted the 
right to counsel constitutes Cronic error. 
8 
the physical presence of counsel had no possible effect on the fairness of the 
trial. Herrera has therefore failed to show that the arraignment in his criminal 
case was a critical stage requiring presence such that prejudice must be 
presumed. 
11. 
Herrera Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Dismissal Of Claims Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel During The Course Of Trial Proceedings 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed several other claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel because the allegations supporting them were "bare and conclusory." 
(R., pp. 2632-38.) Contrary to Herrera's arguments on appeal, the record and 
the applicable law support the district court's rulings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material 
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
affidavits on file." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 
(2007). 
C. Herrera's Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Were Properly 
Dismissed Because They Were Unsupported By Evidence Of Both 
Deficient Performance And Prejudice 
A post-conviction petitioner alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must 
demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). 
An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... " Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not 
make a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). The court is not required 
to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by 
admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 
Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110,112 (2001). 
Review of the record shows that the district court correctly concluded that 
Herrera's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were bare assertions 
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unsupported by specific facts and conclusory allegations unsupported by 
admissible evidence or applicable law. 
1. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing A 
Motion To Suppress Was Unsupported By Evidence 
The district court concluded that Herrera's claim that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his statements based on an 
alleged Miranda4 violation was bare and conclusory. (R., pp. 2632-33.) Review 
of the applicable law and record support this conclusion. 
Whether to file a motion to suppress is a strategic decision, based at least 
in part on the "probability of success of such a motion." Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 
96, 102, 982 P.2d 931 (1999). To be entitled to suppression for a Miranda 
violation, the defendant must show that he was subjected to custodial 
interrogation without the benefit of the Miranda warnings. State v. Loosli, 130 
Idaho 398, 399, 941 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1996). Although statements taken in 
violation of Miranda may not be used in the state's case-in-chief, they are 
admissible to impeach a defendant's testimony. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 
222, 225-26 (1971 ). The defendant has the "ultimate authority" to decide 
whether he will "testify on his or her own behalf." Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 
751 (1983). Thus, completely keeping the statements Herrera made from the 
jury would have required both proof of a Miranda violation (which would have 
kept the statements out of the state's case-in-chief) and Herrera's own election to 
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring warnings related to certain 
rights prior to custodial interrogation). 
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waive his right to testify (which would have kept the statements out as 
impeachment). 
The record shows that Herrera did exercise his right to testify at trial (see, 
~' R., p. 16 (alleging that Herrera was a "key witness[]"), and Herrera does not 
claim he was misinformed of his rights in making that decision. Thus, the 
strategic choice faced by counsel was whether to file a motion to keep the 
evidence of Herrera's statements out of the state's case-in-chief knowing that the 
evidence would come in as impeachment evidence. Herrera presented no 
evidence that this strategic choice was based on any objective shortcoming such 
as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation. 
Moreover, because the evidence of the statements was admissible as 
impeachment evidence the prejudice inquiry is whether keeping the evidence out 
of the state's case-in-chief, but admitting it as impeachment evidence, was likely 
to have affected the outcome of the trial. Herrera presented nothing indicating 
that the form or purpose of admission of the evidence could or would have 
affected the jury's verdict. 
Application of the relevant law to the record in this case shows that the 
district court properly dismissed this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
bare and conclusory. Because the evidence in question would have been 
admissible as impeachment, whether to bring the motion to suppress, even 
assuming it would have been successful, was very much a tactical decision that 
Herrera failed to show was unreasonable. Moreover, because the evidence was 
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admissible for impeachment regardless of the success of the motion, Herrera has 
failed to present a prima facie claim of prejudice. 
On appeal Herrera faults the district court for relying on the lack of 
evidence showing that counsel failed to consult with Herrera or that Herrera 
desired to pursue suppression, claiming the district court was "turning the 
attorney-client relationship on its head." (Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14.5) As the 
applicable law set forth above makes clear, however, keeping evidence of 
Herrera's statements to police out of the trial ultimately depended on Herrera 
choosing to waive his right to testify. Thus, consultation with Herrera and 
Herrera's election would have been central to any strategic decision regarding 
whether to pursue the motion to suppress. Herrera's claims otherwise are simply 
unsupported by relevant law. 
Herrera has failed to show that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to 
suppress based on an alleged Miranda violation. Application of the law to the 
5 On appeal Herrera relies primarily on Exhibit E-4 as demonstrating that the 
district court ignored evidence that a motion to suppress would have succeeded. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14 (citing R., pp. 82-84).) Exhibit E-4 was not submitted in 
support of this claim, however. (R., p. 9 (submitting exhibits (b), (b-1), (b-2) and 
(aa) in support of Claim B).) Because Herrera is relying on evidence never 
submitted in support of this claim, he has failed to show error based on the 
evidence actually submitted. In addition, in Howes v. Fields, _ U.S. _, 132 
S.Ct. 1181 (2012), the Supreme Court of the United States held that asking 
questions of an inmate is not necessarily a custodial interrogation pursuant to 
Miranda. Herrera presented no evidence establishing a custodial interrogation 
under Howes. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17 (repeatedly admitting a lack of 
evidence showing whether factors present in Howes were present in this case 
and including no citations to the record supporting the factual claims trying to 
distinguish this case from Howes).) 
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record shows that Herrera failed to present a prima facie claim of either deficient 
performance or prejudice. 
2. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing For A 
Continuance Was Unsupported By Evidence 
The prosecution filed an amended information adding a persistent violator 
enhancement three months before trial, but did not move for court permission to 
amend until the first day of trial. Herrera, 152 Idaho at 30-31, 266 P.3d at 505-
06. The court arraigned Herrera on the enhancement at that time. & On 
appeal the Idaho Court of Appeals found no error (because no prejudice) in the 
timing of the amendment or the additional arraignment. & One of the grounds 
for the Court of Appeals' ruling was that "Herrera's claim that he had no 
opportunity to engage in plea negotiations while being aware of the persistent 
violator enhancement is disproven by his own statement at his first sentencing 
hearing." & at 31, 266 P.3d at 506. 
In his petition, Herrera alleged that "[c]ounsel needed to file a continuance 
to insure that the petitioner understood the sentencing of what the enhancement 
(persistent violator) had if found guilty, and also of the plea the State was 
offering, because it could mean a life sentence if he did not take it." (R., p. 10 
(verbatim).) The district court granted summary dismissal because this claim 
was "bare and conclusory," citing no admissible evidence that "a continuance 
was necessary for [Herrera] to understand the effect of the enhancement," that a 
continuance would have been granted, or that Herrera suffered any prejudice. 
(R., p. 2633.) 
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The district court was correct. There is no evidence that Herrera needed 
more time to understand the effect of the enhancement, no evidence that the 
court would have granted a continuance for that purpose, and, finally, no 
evidence that Herrera would in fact have pied guilty. As such, there is no 
evidence that counsel's performance was deficient or that Herrera was 
prejudiced. 
Herrera argues that there was evidence of all these things. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 22-36.) Review of the record shows this argument to be without merit. 
There is no evidence that Herrera in fact needed more time to understand 
the alleged plea offer by the state.6 According to Herrera's affidavit, his counsel 
told him at 3:30 the day before trial that the state had extended a plea offer. 
(Augmentation, ~ 26.) The terms of the offer were that if Herrera pied guilty the 
state would not file the persistent violator enhancement and would recommend a 
sentence of three years with one year determinate. (Id.) Thus, according to 
Herrera's own pleading, he knew for approximately 18 hours that the state had 
offered a specific sentencing recommendation significantly less than the five-year 
maximum he faced upon conviction without the enhancement, and that if he pied 
guilty the state would not seek an enhancement that would increase the five year 
maximum. Thus, Herrera had several hours to contemplate entering a plea that 
6 Herrera failed to present admissible evidence that there was in fact a plea offer 
extended by the state. He included in his affidavit a claim that his attorney told 
him there had been a plea offer (Augmentation, ~ 26), but Herrera's statement 
regarding what his attorney said is hearsay if admitted to prove that a plea offer 
had in fact been made and what its terms were. I.R.E. 801. 
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would avoid a sentence of an unspecific amount more than five years but chose 
not to take that agreement. 
According to Herrera he was shocked to learn the next day (the first day of 
trial) that the enhancement would require a sentence from five years to life. (Id., 
,I 30.) Thereafter he told "Rosa" that "they want to give me a life sentence" and 
she advised him to "take the deal" to avoid that. (Id., ,I 31.) Herrera's own 
evidence thus establishes that he understood the exact scope of the state's 
alleged plea offer, consulted with someone close to him (perhaps a wife or 
girlfriend) who advised him to take the offer, but he did not take it. 
The district court correctly concluded that this evidence does not establish 
that Herrera needed more time to understand the alleged plea offer as he 
claimed in his petition. Herrera had several hours, at least, to contemplate the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting or rejecting the alleged plea offer 
while understanding that if he declined the offer the state would file a sentencing 
enhancement. After being informed the exact length of the enhancement 
Herrera discussed the plea agreement with, and was counselled to take it by, 
someone close to him, but he still did not accept the alleged plea offer. The 
district court correctly concluded that Herrera presented no evidence that he 
needed more time to understand the nature of the alleged plea offer. His own 
affidavit shows he understood the offer because he discussed it with his counsel 
and with "Rosa." Herrera understood the agreement, and rejected it, and the 
claim that his counsel provided deficient performance by not seeking more time 
to allow Herrera to change his mind is without merit. 
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Likewise, there is nothing in this record showing a continuance would 
have been granted. Thus, not asking for a continuance was not deficient 
performance and he suffered no prejudice from failing to seek a continuance. 
Herrera apparently acknowledges that this is true in relation to a discretionary 
continuance, but asserts counsel should have sought a continuance of up to 
three days under I.C.R. 10 and I.C. § 19-1908, which the district court had no 
discretion to deny. (Appellant's brief, pp. 28-29.) This argument is without merit. 
A defendant is entitled to an arraignment "[a]fter an indictment or 
information has been filed with the district court." I.C.R. 1 0(a). A defendant who 
"requires time to enter a plea ... must be allowed a reasonable time, not less 
than one day, within which to answer the indictment or information." I.C.R. 1 O(c) 
(emphasis added). Likewise, a defendant is entitled to not less than two days 
"[a]fter his plea" to prepare for trial. I.C. § 19-1908. It is well established, 
however, that a new arraignment and guilty plea is not required after an 
amendment to a charging document. E.fL, State v. Barr, 63 Idaho 59, _, 117 
P.2d 282 (1941 ). Moreover, enhancements are not elements of the charged 
crime. State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 492, 337 P.3d 647, 651 (2014) (defendant 
not entitled to have enhancement considered at preliminary hearing). That the 
district court chose to re-arraign Herrera and take a new plea for just the added 
enhancement did not make the cited provisions of I.C.R. 10 or I.C. § 19-1908 
applicable, much less mandatory. 
Finally, even if Herrera had provided evidence of deficient performance he 
failed to present any evidence of prejudice. Herrera first argues that he does not 
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need any evidence because "the only reasonable, logical and intelligent thing to 
do" when the state offers to dismiss a persistent violator enhancement is to plead 
guilty to the underlying offense. (Appellant's brief, p. 34.) This argument bears 
no correlation to the law or reality. Herrera is not the first defendant to reject an 
offer to dismiss or not file a persistent violator enhancement in exchange for a 
guilty plea to the underlying crime, nor will he be the last, and any defendant 
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove with evidence that the 
reason he rejected the offer was his attorney's deficient performance. 
On appeal Herrera claims that the evidence that he would have taken the 
plea offer had he been given a little more time to consider it can be found on 
page 11 of his affidavit and on pages 970-71 of the record. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
35-36.) Page 11 of the affidavit describes a conversation he had with different 
counsel 14 months after trial. (Augmentation, ,r 68.) Pages 970-71 of the record 
are an excerpt of a transcript containing statements made by Herrera 20 months 
after the trial. (R., pp. 970-71.) Evidence that Herrera came to regret his choice 
months after he was convicted is hardly evidence that he would have accepted 
the plea offer but for counsel's failure to move for three additional days before 
trial to think about it. 
Herrera has failed to show error in the district court's determination he did 
not present evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for not asking for a continuance. Herrera presented no 
evidence that he needed more time to understand the alleged plea offer (to the 
contrary, his affidavit establishes that he understood the alleged offer). His 
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claims that a continuance would have been granted are dubious. Finally, he 
failed to present any evidence of prejudice. He has therefore failed to show that 
the summary dismissal of this claim was erroneous. 
3. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing For A 
Change Of Venue Was Unsupported By Evidence 
Herrera claimed it was ineffective for counsel to not move "to have a jury 
pulled from a couple county away" because the judges, prosecutors and police 
all knew the complaining witness. (R., p. 12 (verbatim).) The district court 
concluded there was no evidence supporting the claim for three reasons. 
"Regardless of whether judges, court staff and law enforcement officers knew Mr. 
Garrett, Mr. Herrera has not provided admissible evidence [1] to show that he did 
not receive a fair trial due to juror exposure to pretrial publicity, [2] that a motion 
for a change of venue would have been granted in the court's discretion, or [3] 
that conducting the trial in a different venue would have resulted in a different 
outcome to the proceedings in the underlying case." (R., p. 2636 (bracketed 
numbering added).) Herrera claims the court erred by addressing pre-trial 
publicity, which was not part of his claim. (Appellant's brief, pp. 41-43.) Because 
Herrera does not challenge the district court's conclusion that he failed to present 
evidence that a change of venue motion would have been granted or that a 
change of venue would have changed the outcome of the trial, he has failed to 
show error. Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156,165,335 P.3d 1, 10 (2014) ("It 
is well settled that where a trial court grants summary judgment on two 
independent grounds and the appellant challenges only one of those grounds on 
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appeal, the judgment must be affirmed." (quotations, citations, and brackets 
omitted)). The district court must be affirmed on the bases for dismissing the 
claim that Herrera does not challenge on appeal. 
4. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In His Trial 
Preparation Was Unsupported By Evidence 
Herrera claimed counsel failed to adequately prepare for trial. (R., p. 12.) 
The district court concluded that Herrera's allegations were "bare and 
conclusory" because unsupported by evidence. (R., pp. 2637-38.) The record 
contains no evidence of what counsel did or did not do to prepare for trial, and 
Herrera has not cited any such evidence on this appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
43-4 7.) Herrera has therefore failed to show error. 
5. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective In How He 
Impeached State's Witnesses Was Unsupported By Evidence 
Herrera claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to "properly cross-
examine state witnesses [and] impeach state witnesses with prior inconsistent 
statements." (R., pp. 12, 16.) The district court concluded Herrera's claim was 
"bare and conclusory" because he presented no "admissible evidence" that 
decisions on how to cross-examine were based on mistakes of law or inadequate 
preparation; "to show how the State's witnesses should have been cross-
examined and impeached"; or showing how different impeachment would have 
resulted in a different outcome. (R., p. 2637.) 
Herrera does not challenge most of this ruling on appeal. He does, 
however, claim there was sufficient evidence to show counsel was ineffective in 
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cross-examining Garrett (the victim) about the number of doctor visits regarding 
the injury inflicted by Herrera, cross-examining Garrett on the number of prior 
felonies he had been convicted of, and cross-examining Garrett and Galow (an 
inmate witness) regarding the nature of Garrett's injuries. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
20-21, 38, 45.) None of these arguments is supported by evidence. 
Herrera presented evidence that Garrett testified at trial that he went to the 
hospital "three times in the next three days for treatment." (R., p. 328 (Trial Tr., 
p. 56, Ls. 4-6).) He also presented a fax from the jail to the prosecutor's office 
with two medical bills from the hospital attached, showing treatment on June 5 
and 6, 2006. (R., pp. 329-31.) This evidence does not show how cross-
examination was even possible, much less that failure to cross-examine on this 
matter was an objectively unreasonable tactical decision that prejudiced Herrera. 
On appeal in the criminal case, Herrera argued that the prosecutor was 
wrong to argue that Garrett had been convicted of only a single felony because 
there was an apparently contradictory statement in the preliminary hearing. 
Herrera, 152 Idaho at 32, 266 P.3d at 507. The Court of Appeals rejected this 
argument, in part, because the record did not show how many felonies Garrett 
had been convicted of. ~ at 33, 266 P.3d at 508. Herrera acknowledges that 
he submitted "no additional information," but argues it was the state's burden to 
disprove his claim. (Appellant's brief, p. 38.) This argument is specious. 
Finally, Herrera argues that his trial attorney should have impeached 
Garrett's and Galow's testimony that Garret was having trouble seeing with 
evidence that Garrett wrote a statement that was "pretty legible and easy to 
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read." (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20 (citing R., pp. 328, 333-34, 356, 360).) This 
argument relies entirely on evidence actually presented at trial-Herrera has 
failed to show that the manner of its presentation was somehow deficient 
performance or prejudicial. In addition, the evidence that Garrett suffered an eye 
injury that required medical treatment was unrefuted. (See, ~, R., p. 328; 
Appellant's brief, p. 21 (Herrera "not claiming that nothing happened to Alan 
Garrett's eye").) Herrera has failed to show that there was anything to be gained 
by challenging Garrett's claim that he had trouble seeing, much less that failure 
to do so amounted to deficient performance and prejudice. 
Herrera has not shown that the district court erred when it found his claims 
that counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when impeaching 
prosecution witnesses were bare and conclusory. 
6. Herrera's Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Obiect 
To Cross-Examination By The Prosecutor Was Unsupported By 
Evidence 
Herrera alleged his counsel was ineffective for failing to "object to 
improper cross-examination by [the] prosecutor." (R., p. 15.) In his 
accompanying brief Herrera clarified that he was claiming that counsel should 
have objected to the prosecutor presenting evidence of the nature of one of his 
three past felony convictions, rather than staying limited to the fact of three prior 
convictions. (R., pp. 2375-76.) The district court concluded that this claim was 
"bare and conclusory" because the evidence did not show that the prosecutor 
admitted evidence of the nature of the felony conviction, and therefore Herrera 
provided no "admissible evidence showing how the cross-examination questions 
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at issue were improper in any way," showing that an objection would have been 
sustained, or showing a reasonable probability the outcome of the trial would 
have been different. (R., p. 2642.) 
On appeal Herrera claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to get 
evidence of his three prior convictions excluded entirely and not objecting when 
the prosecutor asked him if he believed other witnesses had lied. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 38-41, 45.7) Lacking from Herrera's argument is any claim that he 
actually made these claims in his petition. The Court must reject claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel made for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Martin, 119 Idaho 577,579,808 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991); State v. Adams, 138 
Idaho 624, 628, 67 P.3d 103, 107 (Ct. App. 2003). 
Even if the claims had been raised in the petition, there is no evidence in 
the record to support them. When expressing a lack of objection to evidence that 
Herrera had three prior felony convictions, trial counsel stated that such evidence 
was "in the same vain" as evidence of prior convictions used to impeach state's 
witnesses. (R., p. 196 (Tr., p. 145, Ls. 11-15).) Herrera has utterly failed to 
provide any context for the lack of objection, much less show that the decision to 
not object was the result of an objective shortcoming. On the contrary, the 
evidence suggests that the lack of objection was a tactical choice made either 
because the court had already ruled such evidence was proper impeachment or 
7 It is unclear from Herrera's brief whether he is attempting to raise this issue as 
an independent claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or is raising this as a 
prejudice argument in relation to actually asserted claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. (Appellant's brief, pp. 39-41.) 
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because counsel made the tactical decision to let in evidence of prior convictions 
of all witnesses. For example, Herrera argues evidence that he was convicted of 
a felony should have been excluded where that felony was aggravated DUI, a 
crime that does not indicate a lack of honesty. (Appellant's brief, pp. 40-41.) 
However, at trial, evidence that Garrett, the complaining witness, had been 
convicted of felony DUI was admitted. Herrera, 152 Idaho at 32, 266 P.3d at 
507. Thus, asserting at trial that evidence of a felony DUI conviction was 
inadmissible may have prevented the prosecution from impeaching Herrera, but 
would also have prevented impeachment of the state's complaining witness. 
Herrera's claim that the decision to not object was based on an objective 
shortcoming is entirely speculative, as is his claim of prejudice. 
Herrera also argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting when 
the prosecutor asked Herrera whether he thought other witnesses were lying. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 45-46.8) There is no evidence that counsel decided to 
forgo objecting because he felt it was in his client's interests. Counsel could not 
have elicited his client's opinion that the state's witnesses were lying, but that 
does not mean he was not secretly pleased when the prosecutor did so. 
On appeal Herrera does not challenge the dismissal of the claims he 
actually made regarding ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting during 
his cross-examination. Therefore he has failed to show error in the district 
court's ruling. 
8 Herrera's counsel cites this as an "example of ineffective assistance of counsel" 
without claiming it was alleged in the petition. (Appellant's brief, pp45-46.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 28th day of September, 2015. 
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